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ABSTRACT 
 Current acquisition processes and strategies often result in the delivery of 
warfighter tools, whether aircraft, ships, weapons, or submarines, that do not meet current 
mission needs or usability standards. A causal factor is the lack of integration of 
end-users with the designers and developers throughout the acquisition process. Recent 
DOD directives support providing alternative pathways to the traditional acquisition 
process by acquiring technologies at the speed of relevance to meet fluid mission needs. 
Integrating end-users with design teams in a continuous iterative methodology style, i.e., 
Agile, provides feedback early and often, from requirements generation to testing for 
flexibility should capabilities or requirements change. Including warfighters brings their 
operational, maintenance, and user perspectives to better support the program. It is also 
essential to modify warfighter training courses and curriculum to educate warfighters on 
the requirements process. The resulting process and product are improved tri-fold. First, 
the contractor understands the desired capability requirements earlier in and throughout 
the acquisition process regardless of the process used. Second, the warfighter is involved 
early in the capability and functional requirements development and gains an 
understanding of the acquisition process and barriers. Third, the warfighter has better 
training to troubleshoot and maintain these more complex systems. 
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The one consistent element of DOD acquisition programs and pathways is the need 
to entail changes effectively and efficiently deploy relevant capabilities to the warfighters. 
The adaptability to advancements in funding, technology, and database management 
contribute to the developments to identifying the most rapid means to acquiring new 
capabilities. In addition to the updates of the aforementioned contributions, feedback from 
the end-user captures the fundamental baseline in the research and recommendations 
presented here.  
21st century warfighters enter military service with advanced technological 
knowledge and skills that represent potentially high-value tangible benefits to the DOD 
acquisition infrastructure. Research allows acquisition professionals to identify in previous 
programs where input from the end-user would have resulted in an increased pace to 
requirements necessary for the materiel solution. Training the end-users to engage their 
professional service in terms of capabilities not only increases purpose in their efforts, but 
also links to the relevance needed to advance military lethality. 
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This thesis focuses on how the integration of the warfighter, or end-users, with the 
acquisition team, can lead to better technical successes in delivering capabilities within 
programs’ cost and schedule constraints. This integration with early and often inputs and 
feedback from the warfighters can emulate recent acquisition reform that adopts an Agile 
methodology, a continuous iterative development model, in place of the waterfall model, a 
serial-based model. The background and history provides trends in acquisitions and user 
training to highlight recent acquisition challenges and advocate for the need to improve 
and increase the business logic of the warfighter and inclusion within the acquisition teams 
and process. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Department of Defense (DOD) of the United States has maintained a superior 
military in the world with advanced technologies and innovation. However, adversaries are 
closing the gap for various reasons, and one reason is that they have a far less complex and 
lengthy acquisition process than the one used by the DOD (Rand, 2015). Additionally, the 
service life of DOD military assets is decades, and when the assets were more mechanical 
than electronic, upkeep and maintenance were simpler. In today’s current technological 
environment, advancements are continuous and fast-paced. They can influence the next 
generation of warfighting technology in years rather than decades, but with the 
expectations to sustain and operate assets for decades. Yet, the lengthy and complex 
acquisition process and the training of the warfighters are negatively impacting the DOD’s 
chances of maintaining their superiority. 
The DOD 5000 Series of directives and instructions have been the foundation of 
the DOD’s acquisition environment. The DOD’s execution of the acquisition process has 
come under fire for continuous cost overruns and schedule delays of significant 
acquisitions. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) asserts the substantial impact 
of the use of waterfall as required by older versions of the DOD Instruction (DODI) 
5000.02 Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (Harris, 2020). Cost and schedule 
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impacts usually occur during the design and development phases due to technology and 
maturity, which highlight the need to present the functional requirements, such as mission 
and system critical features, as well as non-functional requirements during the design 
phase. For example, from the Navy’s acquisition, the costs for the lead ships for the most 
recent 11 ship class have exceeded the initial budgets, with three exceeding their initial 
budgets by about 80% (Oakley, 2018). The Navy is not faring better with meeting approved 
budgets for follow-on ship costs and is consistently delivered behind schedule. With 
increasing cost overruns and schedule delays, there is pressure to shorten the test and 
evaluation phase to advance the program and reduce cost. By the testing stage, the 
capabilities of the asset may no longer be as cutting edge with the technology or meet 
recently evolved threats (Oakley, 2018). Also contributed from this GAO report, warfighter 
equipment is delivered to the fleet with known deficiencies and incomplete work.  
DOD strategists focus on potential future wars with American adversaries and 
multiple angles America would attack. These adversaries substantiate the primary 
documents used to establish strategic objectives, such as the National Security Strategy 
(NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), and National Defense Strategy (NDS), as well 
as service-specific documents. An attack could come against our military hardware assets, 
such as ships or aircraft, or they may come against our cyber community to attack the 
information channels currently in place. These threats raise the importance of every 
military member to prepare support for the mission with the most lethal capabilities 
possible. The DOD utilizes acquisition pathways to accumulate the necessary materiel 
solutions to aid warfighters across all military services. The materiel solutions result from 
the requirements identified in the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System 
(JCIDS), presented by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), representing 
only one element of the DOD integrated procurement process (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 
2009). This system was introduced in 2003 to offer a joint focus to identifying requirements 
and provide solutions that would benefit warfighters across all services and approach the 
acquisition process with cost-benefitting measures.  
Reforms in defense acquisition processes and policies have continuously evolved 
since the establishment of the DOD after World War II. The most notable acquisition 
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change began with implementing the DOD 5000 (series) in the early 1970s. The latest 
restructuring of defense acquisition took place in January 2020 with DODI 5000.02 
Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework (AAF). One primary purpose of this 
latest update “restructures defense acquisition guidance to improve process effectiveness 
and implement the AAF” (DOD, 2020, p. 1). This policy established the selection process 
of which there are six pathways involved to support operations and sustainment. Utilizing 
the AAF is key to developing the integrative information processes necessary to maintain 
advantages against adversaries strategically.  
The Honorable Frank Kendall, when reflecting on the constant policy changes in 
defense acquisition, stated, “There seems to be an expectation that all programs should 
execute perfectly on time and schedule. This doesn’t happen, of course, so we are often 
dissatisfied with results, leading to political and management practices of constant change. 
The occasional acquisition disaster further fuels this tendency” (2017, p. 180). The latest 
materiel solutions to the battlefield and information from the battlefield are equally 
important, although the acquisition framework focuses primarily on sending materiel 
solutions to the battlefield. The current acquisition framework identifies capability gaps in 
defense performance criteria based on the security strategies. The NDS, for example, 
replaced the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and is released every four years. This 
strategy presents the DOD force’s posture and role to support the President’s NSS. If there 
are capability gaps discovered when comparing against currently existing capabilities, the 
JCIDS process initiates resolutions. The Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) from the 
sponsor determines the need for a materiel solution. 
There have been numerous innovations to defense acquisition strategies and 
processes through the years. The goal is relatively the same: get materiel solutions to meet 
capability objectives into the hands of warfighters as quickly as possible. Everything from 
increasing speed to establishing a Program of Record to Urgent Operational Needs requests 
has been deconstructed and reconstructed with each iterative development of acquisition. 
Aside from random events or ‘one-offs’ wanting to capture the creativity and experience 
from the force, there is little to no exposure training the most common users on 
understanding materiel solutions and basic principles of the acquisition processes, defining 
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the warfighters, and contributing to their craft efficiently. Additionally, there is limited 
exposure to relationships with developing contractors that would grant insight into how 
each component would benefit the objectives. 
Historically, training is the key to tactically fighting wars and maintaining 
effectiveness, retention, and promoting innovation in the ranks. Training improves a 
warfighter’s operational performance and helps build knowledge to contribute to future 
developments. When considered an aid to the performance indexes of the ‘triple 
constraints’ in program management—budget, schedule, and scope—there are tangible 
benefits to training DOD warfighters. These end-users of new capabilities should be trained 
on the implications of the triple constraint so that they can set more realistic, achievable, 
and affordable requirements.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Technological capability advancements continue to outpace the traditional 
acquisition process and expected life span of military assets. The design and 
implementation of newer, software-intensive capabilities take years, often decades, to 
deploy, resulting in obsolescence issues and often do not meet warfighter needs, 
expectations, new threats, or missions. Many factors contribute to this misalignment, 
such as the DOD’s inflexible and typically high-risk waterfall method. Also, the lack of 
end-user involvement in the acquisition requirements process, sustainment, and lack of 
training inhibit their ability to positively contribute to the development of military assets. 
As Figure 1 depicts, it is all about perspective.  
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Figure 1. All About Perspective. Adapted from Gary Larson’s “The Four 
Basic Personality Types” (1990). 
C. OBJECTIVES 
1. Primary 
How can the business logic of the warfighter be improved to incorporate the 
concepts borne from continuous iterative methodologies, such as Agile, to incorporate the 
users early and throughout for constant feedback?  
2. Secondary 
How can warfighter training courses and curriculum be modified to more fully 
educate them on the requirements process? 
D. PURPOSE/BENEFIT 
The purpose of this topic is to dive into how improving the education of the 
warfighter by including the acquisition business and including the end-users early and often 
can positively influence programs meeting their triple constraint. The end-users, who are 
often among the enlisted ranks, are integrated with the acquisition team, both government 
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and contractor industry base, to refine requirements, better understand the acquisition and 
trade-off processes, and provide feedback on usability. The resulting process and product 
are improved two-fold. First, the design team, particularly the contractor who performs 
most of the design and development, understands the desired capability requirements 
earlier in and throughout the acquisition process regardless of the methodology. Secondly, 
the warfighter has early input and more knowledge to troubleshoot and maintain these more 
complex systems. 
The scope of this research and analysis focuses on the Defense Acquisition 
Management System (DAMS), also known as “Little A” acquisition. The authors 
understand and acknowledge that DAMS is part of the “Big A” Acquisition that comprises 
Requirements Generation System, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS), Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE), and DAMS. Both 
JCIDS and PPBE affect the planning, strategy, and execution of DAMS, and all three have 
different drivers. JCIDS is needs-driven, PPBE is calendar-driven, and DAMS is events-
driven. The three major areas do not align for smooth acquisition execution. Secondly, the 
authors also acknowledge that Congress and its actions play a prominent role in the “Big 
A” and “Little A” acquisitions. To bind this thesis, the authors are focusing on DAMS. The 
authors narrowed the discussion to the Navy as they work for the DON, one uniform, and 
one civilian. 
The benefit of this analysis is to move forward with some of the reform that the 
DON has instituted and continue to demonstrate how the research can ultimately change 
the culture of defense acquisition. While we do not speak specifically about culture, 
changes lead to cultural differences, which is needed to embrace these changes long-term. 
Aside from changes to the acquisition process, the benefit is a more educated and 
knowledgeable military to operate and maintain these more complex systems. 
E. SCOPE METHODOLOGY 
In outlining why the business logic of the warfighter is critical to the success of 
defense acquisitions, this paper reviews the literature and analyzes the DAMS process of 
defense acquisition, the current training of the warfighter, and how to integrate the two. 
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The authors used the Joint Strike Fighter’s (JSF) program acquisition strategy, particularly 
the Automated Logistics Information System (ALIS), as case studies to illustrate 
challenges and successes against the acquisition process and end-user inputs. The authors 
combined the Literature Review and Analysis Sections, even though this is atypical, to 
streamline the logic. Analysis of data tends to occur during the literature review and is 
difficult to separate without repeating some of the information from the Literature Review 
Section. The Literature Review and Analysis Section focused on early data with qualitative 
analysis of the JSF acquisition strategy and warfighter training reports from organizations 
such as the GAO, Congressional Research Service, and the Naval Education and Training 
Command. Newer released information outlines the Findings Section to outline actual 
status with baseline plans. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the issues with the defense acquisition process and the general 
ability to provide capability at the speed of relevance. There needs to be reform in the 
defense acquisition process, including contracting to increase participation by a broader 
commercial industry and reform in training curriculums and methods to improve the 
involvement of warfighters in the acquisition process. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
This research evaluates several factors in the struggles of the DOD’s significant 
acquisitions. The first is how the DODI 5000.02 influenced the current trends of substantial 
procurements, focusing primarily on the DON with an overview of the Joint Strike Fighter 
acquisition strategy. The second outlines the roles and responsibilities of the acquisition 
teams and the end-users. The third topic highlights how the reductions in training budgets 
may have been adequate before the systems were more mechanical. Still, the training 
curriculum has not kept pace with increased system complexities and technologies. Lastly, 
we focus on the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) component of the F-35 
program that missed the mark of what the warfighter needed versus what was built and 
delivered. The authors included the analysis in the literature review as the research often 
leads to analyzing the data, and the information presentations are logical.  
A. DOD ACQUISITION 
This section expands on the DOD acquisition process and the increased role of the 
warfighter with additional training. Areas of warfighter inclusion characterize an 
underutilized element when reviewing the DOD acquisition environment. Additionally, the 
type of additional training can be determined to increase the knowledge of the warfighters 
to be key stakeholders on the acquisition teams. 
1. DOD Acquisition Process 
The DOD acquisition process is complex, and it is how the DOD procures 
warfighter assets and supporting systems and services. DOD acquisition comprises of three 
components: 1) Resource Allocation through Planning, Programming, Budgeting and 
Execution (PPBE); 2) Requirements Generation System through the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS); and 3) Defense Acquisition Management 
System (DAMS). Each component has different driving factors, and each factor influences 
the performance, schedule, and cost of programs. This thesis focuses on the DAMS 
component and DODI 5000.02. The DOD acquisition process has undergone several 
iterations of reform to combat schedule delays and cost overruns. The reform has primarily 
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focused on DAMS, or “Little A” acquisition, part of the DOD’s Acquisition Environment 
(see Figure 2). The DOD Directive 5000.0 (DODD 5000.01), The Defense Acquisition 
System, and DODI 5000.02 (DOD, 2020), Operations of the Defense Acquisition System, 
govern acquisition. DODD 5000.01 is “the management process by which the DOD 
provides effective, affordable, and timely systems to the users” (DOD), 2007, p. 2). The 
DOD acquisition process includes two branches of the federal government and an 
influential industry base with influence from the media, warfighters, and the public. The 
DOD is dependent on Congress for funding. Program authorization serves under the 
Executive Branch with its statutory and regulatory requirements and relies heavily on the 
industrial base for janitorial services to major weapons systems. In the center is the program 
manager (PM), who is responsible for managing the program within the triple constraints 
but with no decision authority. An approval and authority hierarchy exists above the PM 
that further adds layers and complexities.  
 
Figure 2. DOD Acquisition Environment. Source: Mortlock (2021). 
Until early 2020, DOD programs followed DODI 5000.02 Operations of the 
Defense Acquisition System designed to follow a waterfall methodology, as shown in 
Figure 3. The chronology of the phases is serialized with rigid milestones, prerequisites, 
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and approvals to enter the next stage. The instruction includes five acquisition objectives—
flexibility, responsiveness, innovation, discipline, and streamlined and effective 
management, which allows for flexibility through tailoring against program needs. 
Responsiveness would provide time-phased capability needs through incremental 
acquisition. There was recognition that the commercial industry performed better than the 
DOD innovation by adopting best commercial practices and business solutions. The 
oversight and milestones managed programs following statutory and regulatory 
requirements. Lastly, decentralization and empowerment would lead to streamlined and 
efficient management. 
 
Figure 3. Operations of the Defense Acquisition System. Source: Quick 
Reference: Defense Acquisition Management System (2008). 
Despite the intent of the 2015 version of DODI 5000.02, the DOD continued to 
experience challenges with the acquisition of major acquisition systems. As stated in the 
background, numerous news articles and GAO reports highlight evidence, delayed critical 
programs, and over-budget—USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), 
Virginia Class Submarines, and the Joint Strike Fighter (Oakley, 2018). There have been 
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many efforts to review the acquisition process to understand the best areas of reform. One 
such investigation performed by the Section 809 Panel charged Congress to focus “its 
efforts on modernizing defense acquisition for the 21st century and making 
recommendations to enable the DOD to more consistently buy what it needs in a timely 
and cost-effective manner” (Section 809 Panel, 2019, p. 1). The core of Section 809 Panel’s 
Roadmap to Success, per Figure 4, illustrates four focus areas to reshape the culture of 
defense business to acquire and deploy capabilities at the speed of relevancy. Each section, 
at a high level, can contribute to continued reform. 
 
Figure 4. Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition 
Regulations. Source: Section 809 Panel (2019). 
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The most obvious recommendation is the “Simplify Acquisition.” Section 809 
Panel’s recommendations dive into statutory and regulatory requirements to reduce 
redundancies and consolidate cumbersome and burdensome acquisition laws for efficient 
and increased industry participation. This recommendation can help with the inclusion of 
a broader set of skills from the industry by removing barriers to better align with planned 
technical capabilities. These changes lead to Section 809 Panel’s recommendation for 
“Leveraging a Dynamic Marketplace.” As the commercial sector has surpassed the DOD 
in technological advancements, adopting commercial practices, processes, and 
methodologies into the DOD acquisition process can further revolutionize the acquisition 
environment. 
Additionally, the Panel further recommends improving how the DOD 
communicates with the industry. Traditionally, the DOD tends to hold the requirements 
close to the vest and receive industry input during the post-contract award. Instead, the 
Panel recommends having early and ongoing communications with the industry with the 
benefits of engaging them as partners and having a better knowledge of market capabilities. 
This industry to DOD communications would continue into the acquisition process and 
include the appropriate end-users. The dynamics of contacts and teaming would change the 
culture of the materiel solution business. Having the right skill sets in the design team 
composition further enables teaming with warfighters in a continuous feedback loop. 
2. Roles and Responsibilities 
High acquisition performance is not dependent upon one stakeholder in the process, 
and the varied stakeholders have different agendas based on expertise and experience. The 
typical primary stakeholders involved in the acquisition process to identify the 
requirements are the warfighters, contractors, DOD, and the industrial base. The non-
defense industrial base is a market that the DOD is trying to and needs to engage. Each 
brings their specialized skills and knowledge to a specific role and responsibility: 
a. Warfighters 
Warfighters are the ultimate end-user of the system and product. The design and 
development can support a range of requirements, from administrative to weapons. 
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Warfighters also play a critical role in establishing objectives for service contracts. 
Defining “warfighter” is not as easy as it sounds. Often during acquisitions, there is a 
warfighter representative, not actual end-users, such as the enlisted and younger officers.  
b. Military-Industrial Base/Contractors 
The industrial base is the private sector that supports the DOD. The industrial base 
has been shrinking and now consists of fewer prime vendors. These vendors performed 
most of the design, development, testing, and fielding of capabilities per the requirements 
of the contracts. Other contractors carry out service contract requirements.  
c. Department of Defense 
The DOD identifies capabilities, defines requirements, and acquires services, 
systems, and products for the warfighters to meet mission areas. Program Managers 
effectively lead the capability developments through decision-making milestones.  
d. Commercial Sector 
The non-defense industrial base or the commercial sector is responsible for the 
recent technological advancements, while the military-industrial base is catching up.  
The warfighter’s role does not focus on obtaining an understanding of the Defense 
Acquisition process, including knowledge of the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) and Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
(PPBE). The DOD is a dynamic environment because the DOD has continuously changed 
requirements to increase uncertainty levels as customers of the industrial base. Mixing the 
acquisition elements, such as JCIDS and PPBE, to the industrial processes creates a 
complex task for the warfighters unfamiliar with both the DOD and industry processes for 
developing new capabilities. Mission requirements may vary as fast as the latest intel 
provided. Furthermore, incorporating new acquisitions may also lead to new conditions on 
the battlefield, as we see done with service contracts in a drawdown period in the U.S. 
Central Command (CENTCOM) region. Warfighters adding clarity to the capability 
conversation must speak through JCIDS to the industrial base in common terminologies 
and, in doing so, seek to increase the efficiency of the acquisition process. The current 
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DOD Decision Support Systems must revolve around the warfighter. This research guided 
the theory that the business logic of the warfighter increases the cost and schedule 
performance indexes of DOD acquisition programs as the DOD increases utilization of the 
industrial base for capability developments. 
3. Understanding the Acquisition Workforce to Include the Warfighters 
The acquisition workforce includes a blended variety of specialized personnel to 
contribute to national defense. The easy answer is to say every member of the DOD is part 
of the acquisition workforce. Ideally, everyone would approach their job as a craft worth 
contributing improvement ideas for safer, more reliable, and cost-effective solutions. 
While one benefit of this workforce approach is to provide the typical private citizen an 
opportunity to contribute to the nation’s security and defense via contracting, the warfighter 
should trust the DOD acquisition methodologies to capture the most efficient and 
innovative products to meet the mission needs. The right balance of skills needed must also 
include effective communication with the warfighter to accomplish program objectives. 
Whether Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) are internal to the government or Special 
Government Employees (SGEs) and Highly Qualified Employees (HQEs) via Direct Hire, 
none of these matter if the result does not meet mission objectives. With many stakeholders 
involved in the acquisition process, it is essential to ensure everyone clearly understands 
their respective roles that focus on the goals coming from the program office. The 
warfighter and service entities want to receive the best capabilities. The government service 
employees want to ensure the performance cost-effectively with low risk. At the same time, 
this rewards the contractor with a sustainable business that helps meet the program 
objectives.  
The benefits are seen in the Defense Software Innovation Board engaging in 
specialized training that led to new software acquisition pathways and rectified workforce 
issues. In the past two decades, we have seen high levels of hiring authorities build up the 
current acquisition workforce that now includes 180,000 personnel (OUSD A&S, 2020). 
Many of these maintain long-term employment and become SMEs leading program and 
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project offices. Many of the program offices turn to Direct Hire Authorities with SGEs and 
HQEs to increase innovation across the acquisition (as seen in Figure 5).  
The need to understand who the stakeholders are and how contracting for 
acquisitions works is seen by reviewing the latest trends in DOD contract spending 
compared to the overall DOD budget context. The Defense Acquisition Trends 2020 report 
states, “Defense contract obligations have grown 31% since FY2015, which was the last 
year of the previous defense drawdown” (McCormick, 2020, p. 2). 
As reflected in Figure 5, contract obligations consume 55% of 2019’s DOD Total 
Obligation Authority, the “third highest over a span of the last twenty years” (McCormick, 
2020, p. 1). What is perhaps the most relevant to the business logic of the warfighter is the 
increased usage rate of contracts compared to the overall budget leveling off. Contract 
usage has increased though the budget is becoming stagnant (McCormick, 2020). Business 
logic or acquisition capability logic would present a framework for warfighters to 
contextualize their experiences that improve the DOD’s relationship with the industrial 
base. The largest chasm seen moving forward with the increase of contractors and 50% of 
Total Obligation Authority in acquisition displays how the contracts do not include any 
role for the warfighters to contribute to the requirements of acquisition programs. 
 
Figure 5. DOD Contract Obligations vs. Budget Authority. Source: 
McCormick (2020). 
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4. Training the Acquisition Workforce to Include the Warfighters 
The federal government utilizes a business practice called “category management” 
that refers to “eliminating redundancies, increasing efficiency, and delivering more value 
and savings from the Government’s acquisition programs” (OMB, 2019, p. 1). This effort 
to increase responsiveness aligns with the President’s Management Agenda but is void of 
the role of the warfighter in the acquisition process and fails to address the need for 
developing the business logic of the warfighter. The findings highlight the lack of training 
for the typical end-user or warfighter about defense acquisition, obtaining feedback from 
recent operations, and little involvement in systems maintenance. Section 9.504 of the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provides a list of the Contracting Officer’s 
responsibilities as “identify and evaluate potential organizational conflicts of interest as 
early in the acquisition process.” The category management efforts from the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) include the roles and responsibilities of Contracting 
Officers as found in the FAR, improving relationships with the defense industry, 
maintaining accountability to regulations, and adopting the best solutions for critical 
functions.  
One method to introduce the warfighter to developing an understanding of the 
defense acquisition system, the role of federal employees, the relationship with contractors, 
and what information would benefit contracting officers that do not currently exist is 
training. Training takes place for every warfighter who enters service in the DOD. Yet, 
training warfighter processes and methods to increase the overall effectiveness of the 
acquisition process does not exist outside the scope of After-Action Reports (AARs) that 
may provide data to Combatant Commanders submitting capability gaps to the JROC. 
DODI 5000.02, released January 23, 2020, only mentions warfighters when referring to 
Urgent Capability Acquisition needs. This instruction also does not address training 
opportunities that would benefit the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition 
and Sustainment (OUSD A&S) priority to enable acquisition innovation nor the goal of 
development. It also highlights the “speed of relevance” needed to respond to maintain 
readiness against adversaries. Of all the documents produced to increase acquisition 
performance, none focus on integrating the warfighter into the acquisition process.  
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GAO-17-468 reviewed DODI 1322.31 Common Military Training. Of the 11 
common military training requirements across all DOD services, none include training 
sessions that provide the average warfighter insight into these documents, their role in 
identifying capability gaps, nor any insight into the defense acquisition system. 
Understanding that the generation of requirements does not fall into the Defense 
Acquisition Management System category, but rather the JCIDS category, there are still 
opportunities to integrate the warfighter in the acquisition life cycle in other ways than 
Testing and Evaluation. Acquisition processes do not focus on training the warfighter to 
enhance the overall acquisition process in two critical ways. First, there are opportunities 
for end-users to contribute more to the Materiel Solution Analysis. The disparity between 
the JCIDS process and the Defense Acquisition System, where the Materiel Solution 
Analysis decision occurs, highlights the missed opportunities for warfighters to contribute 
to the desired capabilities. Secondly, the warfighter currently has limited maintenance and 
reporting requirements for the latest materiel solutions. The projected outcomes of 
increased training and development of a warfighter’s business logic are improvements to 
system resilience.  
Three recent examples reflect the importance of training to meet current needs and 
improve overall efficiency and effectiveness in DOD programs. A February 2021 GAO 
report states, “DOD has updated aspects of war-game exercises and mobility training to 
prepare for a contested environment but has not updated training for the surge sealift fleet” 
(Williams Brown, 2021, p. 17). In another example from a January 2021 memorandum, 
the CNO stated, “the Naval logistics enterprise must be fundamentally transformed to 
become more agile and resilient, both operationally and administratively,” and “the 
enterprise must also have the capabilities, proficiency, and training to match fleet emission 
control and tactical situation requirements” (Chief Naval Operations [CNO], 2021, p. 1). 
The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard Maritime Strategy Advantage at Sea is the third 
recent example. This strategy, released in December 2020, seeks ways to employ long-
term strategic competitions by delivering integrated All-Domain Naval Forces. One of the 
six priorities established in this strategy is “training and education for warfighting 
advantages in dynamic environments” (Secretary of the Navy [SECNAV], 2020, p. 17). 
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The answer across the DOD to remain a lethal force, adaptive to quickly evolving threats, 
is to incorporate innovative training for warfighter development. Our findings identify 
DOD acquisition processes that have yet to provide warfighter integration, much less 
training on acquisition principles and understandings necessary to improve the speed of 
capability. 
The civilian sector of the DOD is quite inclusive, allowing SMEs to interact with 
SGEs and HQEs by use of the Direct Hiring Authority. Maintaining life cycle support for 
new systems has noticeable increases in contractor responsibilities established that prevent 
the warfighters from engaging. Training focuses on operating the system but overall lacks 
increasing the warfighters’ ability to repair the system should it break down. The issue here 
is the critical impact of sustaining military operations for forward-deployed assets should 
they fail. Having training and experience with the acquisition processes and teams would 
give end-users advanced knowledge on systems and positively impact the triple constraints 
program managers face with any program of record.  
Despite the size of the workforce, minimal training is presented to the average 
frontline warfighter on understanding acquisition processes, showing improvement 
methods to the acquisition process, and feedback opportunities on current capabilities. 
Currently, on the Navy’s Learning Management System, only e-learning courses related to 
the Risk Management Framework concerning Acquisition and Information System 
Security Engineers are found. Most of the training delivered is to those participating in the 
CBA as part of the 10-step process, including study definition, needs assessments, and 
solution recommendations. According to the CJCSI 5123.01H, performance requirements, 
which refers to a “performance attribute of a system considered critical or essential to the 
development of an effective military capability” (Appendix A-4), are held responsible to 
the Chief of Staff of an Armed Force to be validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council. The JROC “assesses joint military capabilities, and identifying, approving, and 
prioritizing gaps in such capabilities, to meet applicable requirements to meet national 
defense strategies” (Joints Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2018, A-5). Combatant Commanders, 
Services, and other DOD components submit capability requirements documents to the 
Special Access Program Control Office and the Requirements Management Branch as 
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reflected in Figure 6. This demonstrates the review boards and functional relationships 
across the JCIDS processes that include validation of requirements for six entities. Those 
are the Services, Special Operations, Intelligence, Defense Business Council, 
USCYBERCOM, and the Nuclear Weapons Council. Each grants authority to validate and 
document capability requirements. 
 
Figure 6. JROC Subordinate Boards and Related Organizations. Source: 
CJCSI 5123.01H (2018). 
With the exponential layers between the warfighter and the JROC, while 
considering the amount of time it would take to route capability requirements through that 
chain of command, the need for clarity with speed is critical to successfully delivering the 
product acquired. Technology and internal SharePoint websites and other document 
delivery services may minimize the time spent between each echelon. Still, the business 
logic of the warfighter remains an issue. Without being trained to present essential 
requirements in how the JROC offers capabilities via the JCIDS process, the warfighter 
hinders the most efficient acquisition framework. Additionally, taking the knowledge the 
end-user gained from participating in the JCIDS process into the DAMS process would 
ensure continuity in interpreting the capability requirements into functional requirements 
and so forth. The findings of this research identified the restructuring of defense acquisition 
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with the AAF focused on restoring military readiness, but primarily through the means of 
expanding and strengthening alliances and partnerships as defense business reform lines of 
effort build “a safe, secure, and resilient defense industrial base” (Vergun, 2020, para 12 ).  
“Allocate Resources Effectively” and “Enable the Workforce,” of Section 809 
Panel’s recommendations, see Figure 4, extend beyond acquisition programs and 
acquisition professionals to the incorporation of the warfighters. Warfighters are 
considered the end-users of the acquisition but do not have methods to take more 
responsibility and accountability for the product they are receiving. The increased defense 
industrial base depends on the industrial base’s ability to maintain contractual obligations 
of the acquired capability through life cycle support, including up to and during operations 
and sustainment.  
Conducting a SWOT analysis (Humphrey, 2005), as seen in Figure 7, brings 
balance and understanding of the recommendations set forth by the Section 809 panel. The 
internal strengths of a warfighter rest in their experience and ability to provide feedback on 
the human integration with current capabilities. As it pertains to the current status of the 
warfighter’s business logic, the weakness is that it is relatively non-existent. With no means 
to identify requirements, capabilities, or performance measures being commonplace, there 
remains nothing to shore up internally. The review of the warfighter’s business logic 
specifically against the barriers found in their limited exposure to acquisition concepts 
maximizes the benefit for its development. Crucial to the analysis is developing means to 
minimize or eliminate weaknesses and integrate strategy and plans for the opportunities 
available. Reflected in the research was the potential role warfighters could have earlier in 
the acquisition process. Specifically, this included the Initial Capability Assessment, 
providing end-users a chance to present KPPs and criteria desired, which would impact the 
decision on a materiel solution or a change to current capabilities. 
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Figure 7. Business Logic of the Warfighter SWOT Analysis 
Identifying opportunities and threats, the external factors, come more 
straightforward than the strengths and weaknesses. Specifically, training to identify gaps 
among operations and sustainment would allow warfighters a higher level of ownership in 
the capability development process. Integrating warfighters earlier in the development 
process also provides moments for senior leadership to guide the warfighter’s feedback to 
harmonize with the security strategies and capabilities. Threats against the business logic 
of the warfighter include the increase in autonomous systems, which would take away the 
need for warfighters to engage as thoroughly, and the increased use of contracts and 
outsourcing for product sustainment. These potential threats decrease the overall need to 
prepare warfighters for a more hands-on engagement with developing capabilities and 
identifying requirements. 
B. JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF) PROGRAM 
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program makes an excellent case study. The literature 
review and analysis focuses on data from the early years of the initial program’s acquisition 
strategy to establish the baseline and program expectations. The JSF program leveraged 
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acquisition reforms to streamlined approaches, and this paper reviews and analyzes the 
successes and failures of the program in its acquisition execution. Another strategy used 
was the IPT that included the end-user. This paper uses the Automated Logistics 
Information System (ALIS), part of the F-35 aircraft sustainment system, to highlight the 
effectiveness of the IPT.  
1. JSF Acquisition Program 
Developed out of the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program, the Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF) program set out in late 1993 to replace the Navy’s A-6 attack planes 
and possibly the F-14s and Air Force’s F-16s (Bolkcom, 2002). The Air Force required a 
conventional landing and takeoff (CTOL), and the Navy needed a carrier-based (CV) 
variant. (Bolkcom, 2002). Per congressional direction in 1995, the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) developed an advanced short takeoff and vertical 
landing (STOVL) aircraft that extended capabilities for the Marine Corps to replace the 
AV-8B jump jet (Bolkcom, 2002). In 1994, Congress directed the JSF program to 
incorporate STOVL (Bolkcom, 2002). Figure 8 illustrates the three variants. The DOD 
designated the Joint Strike Fighter as a major defense acquisition program in May 1996 
(Bolkcom, 2002). The JSF program’s initial plan was to procure approximately 3,000 JSFs 
from 2005–2030, with two-thirds for the Air Force, 640 for the Marine Corps, 300 for the 
Navy, and 60 for British Royal Navy (Congressional Budget Office, 1997). The purpose 
of the Joint Strike Fighter program was “to focus on joint development and production of 
a next-generation fighter/attack plane” and “have maximum commonality in airframe, 
engine, and avionics components to reduce production and operation and support costs” 
(Bolkcom, 2002, p. 2). To align with maximum commonality, even though the services 
have different uses and missions for their aircraft, the program office targeted 80% by value 
in commonality for interchangeability among the variants. The commonality and large 
procurement would keep costs down (Congressional Budget Office, 1997). Even at the 
program’s start, the cost was a factor, and early requirements included price goals 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1997). 
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Boeing and Lockheed Martin (LM) were both involved in the concept 
demonstration phase, planned for 1997–2001 (Bolkcom, 2002). The purpose was for each 
contractor to “build and flight-test two aircraft (one CTOL and one STOVL) to demonstrate 
their concepts of three JSF variants to meet the different operational requirements of the 
various services” (Bolkcom, 2002, p. CRS-2). Schedule delays occurred during the concept 
demonstration, with LM’s testing taking place a month after Boeings’ testing (Bolkcom, 
2002). Different views place the blame on other areas ranging between technical challenges 
with the complex software integration and STOVL propulsion design, reduction in funding 
during the Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase (EMD), and the delayed 
receipt of Congressional mandate for 20 hours of STOVL flight testing completed before 
EMD (Bolkcom, 2002). 
 
Figure 8. Joint Strike Fighter Variants. Source: Congressional Research 
Service (2020). 
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Lockheed Martin’s design won the bid to lead a team of contractors in the down-
selection after the concept demonstration phase (Bolkcom, 2002). Lockheed Martin 
developed and produced the JSF with three variants—CTOL (Air Force), CV (Navy), and 
STOVL (Marine Corps and the British Royal Navy) (Bolkcom, 2002). 
The JSF program was proactive and ahead of its time, implementing recent 
acquisition reforms to tailor the acquisition process, including industry and warfighter 
interaction early in the acquisition through integrated Products Teams and simplifying and 
streamlining the contracting process. JSF is the DOD’s largest acquisition and one of the 
most complicated with complex technologies, multi-service requirements, and the 
pressures of keeping costs down (Congressional Budget Office, 1997). Before the concept 
phase, the DOD had not provided the JSF program costs to Congress (Congressional 
Budget Office, 1997). The Congressional Budget Office (Congressional Budget Office) 
gleaned that the flyaway cost goals of the fighter through the contract instructions offered 
to the industry to calculate the total acquisition cost of about $165 billion. However, the 
CBO’s estimate was about $219 billion (Congressional Budget Office, 1997). Both 
estimates accounted for incorporating commercial practices and existing or developing 
technologies to reduce costs (Congressional Budget Office, 1997). The cost estimates also 
accounted for the commonality of the systems “—airframe structure and systems, engines, 
and avionics—as great as possible” across the three variants (Congressional Budget Office, 
1997, p. 42). Developmental and operational phases projected further cost savings 
(Congressional Budget Office 1997). 
Cost and affordability was the central focus of the JSF program by trading off 
capabilities to meet cost goals to the point where the “the contractors have been instructed 
to estimate the sensitivity of the JSF’s costs to desired capabilities so that the program and 
the services will be able to make trade-offs to lower the prices” (Congressional Budget 
Office, 1997, p. 43). Affordability provided the basis to achieve commercial processes, off-
the-shelf technologies, and developing technologies (Congressional Budget Office, 1997). 
For an advanced aircraft intended to replace an aging aircraft fleet and last well into the 
future, the cost directed the contractors to lower risk technologies, even if that meant giving 
up capabilities (Congressional Budget Office, 1997). Figure 9 shows the JAST/JSF funding 
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as requested by the DOD and recommended by the Senate Appropriations Committee 
(SAC). 
At the start of program initiation, the DOD was undergoing another acquisition 
reform in the face of budget challenges that the JSF program leveraged. Instead of the 
traditional DODI 5000.02 as described in Section A, Part 1 above, the JSF exercised new 
levels of flexibility and efforts to reduce unnecessary reporting and review procedures 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1997). The JSF could also continue research and 
development of its new technologies further into the acquisition process with the required 
formal reviews (Congressional Budget Office, 1997). With tailoring options and less 
formalized oversight and approvals, the JSF opted to bypass the Milestone I review as 
outlined in the initial program schedule shown in Figure 10 (Congressional Budget Office, 
1997). 
 
Figure 9. JAST/JSF Funding in FY1997. Source: Bolkcom (2002). 
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The JSF program management was proactive in “early and intensive involvement 
of a number of personnel who will be affected by decisions about the design (according to 
a program briefing that approach will involve industry and ‘warfighter’—a potential user 
of the system-earlier in the process)” (Congressional Budget Office, 1997, p. 45). The 
program chose to implement an Integrated Product Teams approach to promote early 
engagement with industry and warfighters (Congressional Budget Office, 1997).  
 
Figure 10. Program Schedule for the Joint Strike Fighter through the 
acquisition management process. Source: Congressional Budget Office 
(1997). 
2. Joint Strike Fighter Concerns 
Even in the early days, representatives from Congress, the executive branch, and 
the involved military services had concerns with the JSF program. In its 1997 report, the 
Congressional Budget Office raised many problems with the JSF program strategy–cost, 
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commonality, technology, capability trade-offs, acquisition reform, schedule and potential 
for concurrency, impact to the industrial base, and program management structure 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1997). 
The primary concern was whether the program could maintain reduced costs as 
previously touted. One challenge was if the program was over-optimistic about managing 
costs, given that historically, aircraft acquisition had exceeded original budgets and 
schedules (Congressional Budget Office, 1997). For the Air Force, the price was also a 
factor. Air Force aircraft are at a lower cost because the requirements are more 
straightforward than the Navy’s, which require increased stealth and the ability to take off 
and land on the shorter landing strips of aircraft carriers (Congressional Budget Office, 
1997). Additional reflections made in the report focused on the Air Force, Navy, and 
Marine Corps variants. The Air Force did not want to pay more for aircraft with more 
capability than needed to remain standard with the Navy’s variant—considering the Air 
Force purchased the bulk of the JSF, which became a factor for the JSF program team. The 
Marine Corps’ cost would be affected due to Navy requirements. This same report suggests 
overarching concern was that of the nearly 3,000 aircraft, the Navy was only procuring 300 
and yet seemed to require the most capabilities, contributing to the cost per aircraft.  
The increase in cost to the Air Force and the Marine Corps was due to the push for 
commonality to reduce the acquisition costs and future modernization and sustainment 
costs (Congressional Budget Office, 1997). Figure 11 provides data on past joint 
acquisitions that have either ended with the original joint venture requirements, quantities, 
and services envisioned but not yet met. Commonality, while a goal for a specific asset, 
such as one aircraft or ship class, requires compromise when involving services that have 
different missions and therefore different needs. Someone needs to give up something or 
gain too much in a settlement. The Navy conceded some requirements to help with keeping 
the costs down (Congressional Budget Office, 1997). To attain commonality to keep costs 
down, if there is enough departure from needs, then the risk is that any of the services can 
exit the JSF program, thereby potentially jeopardizing the program’s future. 
Past trends indicated the DOD was not successful in increasing the performance of 
existing systems. Yet, that was one of the plans for the JSF program—use existing or 
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mature technologies to reduce development costs (Congressional Budget Office, 1997). An 
integrated system concept introduced methods to reduce aircraft weight, budget, and make 
maintenance and sustainment easier. However, some analysts believed that any costs saved 
with lesser weight would create significant maintenance challenges depending on the type 
of problem or failure that could require fixes to the whole system (Congressional Budget 
Office, 1997).  
 
Figure 11. Trends in Commonality during Selected Development Programs. 
Source: Congressional Budget Office (1997). 
A central theme of the program was trade-off capabilities to achieve affordability 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1997). As costs inevitably grow, so do the trade-offs related 
to which performance requirements to keep. The JSF program’s plan was to trade-off 
capabilities for cost to a limited extent. With three variants with specific capability 
requirements for very different mission goals, the capability trade-off would not be an easy 
task. The Navy’s variant is the most expensive with the fewest quantity to be procured 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1997). The report also highlighted the Air Force’s variant 
is less costly than the Navy’s, but with the most planes needed, while the Marine Corps 
variant is vastly different and intended for an important ally. There are many stakeholders 
when discussing which capabilities become a lower priority to sustain the budget. The 
trade-off for costs can have unintended consequences. For example, with existing 
30 
technologies as the technical base, there were plans to reduce redundancies with the in-
flight controls to control costs further; however, that could introduce a vulnerability risk 
during operation.  
The JSF program’s leveraging of acquisition reform raised concerns that the 
reduced oversight through formal reviews could “introduce a risk that DOD leadership 
could overlook important elements of program planning, developing, testing, and 
reviewing” (Congressional Budget Office, 1997). Additionally, the “design to cost” 
concept, developed in the 1970s by the Deputy Secretary of Defense David Parkard, used 
by the JSF program, did not inspire confidence in analysts that the program would be 
successful in staying within the budget. 
The flexibility resulting from acquisition reforms provided greater flexibility to the 
JSF program. From a schedule perspective, the JSF program overlapped the development 
and production phases. This overlap is called “concurrency,” and how much of the schedule 
was concurrent was of concern, mainly if delays occurred. Delays could result from 
technical to funding problems. With the requirement for three variants, even with 80% 
value in commonality, remaining on schedule was met with skepticism given the history 
of other aircraft acquisitions. 
The DOD intended the JSF contract award to be a “winner-take-all” approach rather 
than a workshare agreement among multiple contractors (Congressional Budget Office, 
1997). As the largest DOD acquisition and combining aircraft requirements for three 
services, there would be an impact on an already shrinking military-industrial base and the 
future of competition. However, the Bush administration preferred the “winner-take-all” 
strategy at that time, and a study conducted by the DOD confirmed this was the best option 
(Bolkcom, 2002). 
Lastly, as a joint program, the program management structure was designed with 
the Air Force and Navy jointly running the program with each service taking lead roles 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1997). The cooperative program organization meant 
frequent turnover of program managers and shortening of tenures (Congressional Budget 
Office, 1997). In previous attempts at acquisition reform, “past reformers of the acquisition 
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process have recommended that acquisition executives remain in place for long periods to 
improve continuity and thus increase expertise and enhance accountability” (Congressional 
Budget Office, 1997, p. 53). The JSF program’s structure goes against previous 
recommendations for longer tenures. The other concern is the liberties the program 
management team took in its interpretation of the acquisition reform. Given the size and 
scope of the program, reductions in informal reviews to meet affordability goals raised 
concerns with Congress and the DOD (Congressional Budget Office, 1997). 
C. AUTONOMIC LOGISTICS INFORMATION SYSTEM (ALIS) 
This section focuses on the effectiveness of the IPT and end-user inputs with the 
Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) and aligns to the introduction presented 
in section B. As part of the F-35 program, ALIS offers a sustainment tool to aid the 
warfighter with maintaining and sustaining the F-35 aircraft systems. ALIS is an 
information technology system with web services on a distributed network to provide 
users’ security and the latest information. The system offers integrated “capabilities 
including operations, maintenance, prognostics, supply chain, customer support services, 
training, and technical data” (Lockheed Martin, 2009, para 2). With increased data on the 
software-intensive and globally networked F-35 fleet, ALIS reduces operations and 
maintenance costs to meet the overall program cost goals. With the in-flight transmission 
of data, such as Health Reporting Codes, the system could proactively enable “the pre-
positioning of parts and qualified maintainers on the ground, to minimize downtime and 
increase efficiency once the aircraft lands. ALIS allows the F-35 system to deliver 
operational and training execution with innovative technologies that meet the demands of 
everyday use” (Lockheed Martin, 2009, para 4–5).  
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III. FINDINGS 
This chapter discusses the findings from the analyses performed in Chapter II on 
the DOD acquisition environment and benefits of updating training. Additionally, the 
findings from the JSF and ALIS are further discussed.  
A. DOD ACQUISITION 
With the faster pace of technological advancements requiring quicker updates to 
remain relevant, the DOD reached a critical juncture on the future of acquisitions. The 
DOD recognized that despite previous changes and the ability to tailor the DODI 5000.02 
Operations of the Defense Acquisition System, the DOD continued to deliver warfighting 
assets late, over budget, with some capability obsolescence. In January 2020, the DOD 
released the upgraded DODI 5000.02 “Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework” 
(AAF) to implement rapid and agile acquisition, providing multiple and varied acquisition 
pathways. Following on the heels of the newly released DODI 5000.02, the DOD released 
an updated DODD 5000.01. The coupled release of both instructions reflects “a 
comprehensive redesign of the DOD 5000 Series acquisition policies, which were 
streamlined and modernized to empower program managers, facilitate flexibility and 
enhance our ability to deliver capability at the speed of relevance” (Defense.gov, 2020). 
This overarching policy design allows the United States “to acquire products and services 
that satisfy user needs with measurable and timely improvements to mission capability, 
materiel readiness, and operational support, at a fair and reasonable price” (Kobren, 2020). 
The goals are to “Deliver performance at the speed of relevance” by using the principles 
of operating policies of 1) Empowering program managers; 2) Simplifying acquisition 
policy; 3) Employing tailored acquisition approaches; 4) Conducting data-driven analysis; 
5) Actively managing risk; and 6) Emphasizing product support and sustainment (Kobren, 
2020, para 3). Along with the operating policies, other goals are to 1) Use the adaptive 
acquisition framework, DODI 5000.02; 2) Emphasize competition; 3) Employ 
performance based-acquisition strategies; 4) Plan for product support; 5) Implement 
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effective life cycle management; 6) Implement reliability and maintainability by design; 
and 7) Maintain a professional workforce (Kobren, 2020). 
With a new directive and instruction availability, the F35 program opted to switch 
and align to the AAF strategy. It is too soon to know the impacts of the updates on these 
acquisition processes in this paper. Still, these changes align with the rapid speed at which 
warfighter assets are acquired and deployed. The framework of the acquisition process 
design, Figure 12, promotes critical thinking in the strategic planning and tactical execution 
of programs to pivot better as capabilities accommodate changing mission needs. 
 
Figure 12. DOD Adaptive Acquisition Framework Pathway. Source: DODI 
5000.02 (2020). 
Today, the commercial industry is surpassing the DOD in innovation. The panel 
uncovered that the defense acquisition process did not allow for the easy inclusion of new 
competition, particularly in software-related industries such as cybersecurity and software 
development practices. Effects to the business logic of the warfighter include the lack of 
enabling the workforce integration throughout the acquisition process, the lack of 
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immediate access or unrestricted access to new industry bases, and the lack of a 
collaborative relationship with industry in general. The relationship structure allows the 
DOD to provide requirements and oversight while the contractor plans and executes. There 
are specific management tools; however, the DOD has not realigned the oversight process 
to today’s acquisition needs. Collaboration requires appropriate and ongoing 
communications to ensure both parties agree on interpreting the requirements during the 
process in case there is disagreement. Without this cooperation, the government and 
industry teams remain stove-piped and less inclined to share when there are issues. 
When capabilities requirements changed, there was no method to revise the JCIDS 
requirements and budgeting to account for the changes and plans associated with the 
program. There is no requirement by the DOD to ensure services do not drop out of joint 
ventures or reduce the quantity. One example is the Marine Corps’ V-22 joint venture with 
the Army, Navy, and the Air Force: “about 600 for the Marine Corps, 230 for the Army, 
about 300 for the Navy, and about 80 for the Air Force” (Congressional Budget Office, 
1997). While the V-22 program had progressed well in development, the Army decided to 
exit, the Navy reduced its quantity to 50, the Marine Corps reduced its amount to 425, and 
the Air Force reduced its number to 50. Total V-22 quantity went from 1,200 to about 525. 
The reduction of unit quantities leads to increases in the per-unit cost. 
B. BENEFITS OF TRAINING REVISIONS 
Training is fundamental across all DOD entities and services. In the Navy, the 
Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) identifies, validates, and resources 
training requirements for every service member and government service worker across a 
wide range of topics. Currently, the valuable principles and lessons associated with 
acquisition (i.e., identifying requirements, developing capabilities, understanding measures 
of performance) are not part of the training catalog. Should training in these principles 
become resourced, the current training framework offers an agile nature to maintain the 
pace of change in the latest industry developments. The steps associated with a Job Duty 
Task Analysis (JDTA) (Figure 13) provide pertinent data to course developments and 
training validations that satisfy training objectives.  
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Figure 13. NETC Course Development/Revision End to End Process. Source: 
Naval NAVEDTRA 137 (2011). 
By working through the NETC process to deliver a course of instruction, the latest 
updates with training requirements adjust with the principles associated with AAF. BLWT 
involves all stakeholders in the acquisition framework, not just the warfighter. These would 
include requirement and resource sponsors, warfare sponsors, community managers, and 
various SMEs. These inputs allow accurately trained technical documentation to reflect the 
latest acquisition framework principles and processes. One additional benefit of utilizing 
the NETC course development process is that it enables changes to training based on gaps 
in training analysis to quickly adapt to the requirements using tasks such as the Front-End 
Analysis (FEA). The FEA “establishes a repeatable, defendable, and standardized process 
to improve performance of existing training” (NAVEDTRA 135C and 138).  
The primary focus for training warfighters is to operate with capabilities in mind 
while developing their ability to increase Acquisition Readiness effectively. Acquisition 
Readiness (AR) refers to the ability of the DOD service or entity to request and integrate 
new capabilities per the AAF efficiently. AR reflects adjusted cost and schedule 
performance indexes, the development of an ICD, and cost-efficient management. It also 
represents the user-feedback integration throughout the acquisition life cycle. The 
recommendation to introduce business logic to the warfighter involves training titled AR. 
Three phases make up AR: Acquisition Readiness I, Acquisition Readiness II, and 
Acquisition Readiness III, as seen in Figure 14.  
Each phase of Acquisition Readiness would provide incremental steps to 
professional development. Starting with the basics in AR I, the warfighter learns the current 
acquisition framework available and wherein the process is best for their contributions to 
the discussion on new capabilities. This method presents a technical approach to tactical 
warfighting. AR II is the next level which begins a more in-depth review of the acquisition 
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pathways and roles the warfighters may participate in once they become more senior and 
enter a manager role. Testing, fielding, and risk management make up most product support 
elements found in AR III training. 
 
Figure 14. Acquisition Readiness Training Phases I, II, and III 
The functional areas identified in the proposed BLWT seek to promote 
understanding of the warfighter’s role in the DOD Adaptive Acquisition Framework and 
increase the feedback to their respective chain of command through the JCIDS process and 
industry professionals. Warfighters not typically engaged with the acquisition cycles would 
officially understand how to relay to leadership Key Performance Parameters to desired 
capabilities. Aside from educational programs with Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU), the average warfighter obtains limited exposure to 
acquisition life cycle processes. Still, their input may provide the right focus areas even in 
the assessment elements. In the same way that greater flexibility from acquisition reform 
benefits the JSF program, this too bestows flexibility to the role of the warfighter in the 
acquisition framework.  
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By offering BLWT training, the DOD is able to collect better information aligned 
to the acquisition methods and processes because the business logic of the warfighter 
insights can increase AR. The ability of the warfighter to communicate the requirements 
needed on the battlefield enhances with the increase of BLWT. The need is present for the 
warfighters to have a streamlined and automated ability to provide feedback on current 
capabilities, such as key performance parameters (KPPs), while simultaneously presenting 
system requirements to improve operational performance. Integrating trained warfighters 
reduces the number of barriers between the public and private sectors involved.  
Recent experiences during the Integrated Battle Problem 21 Exercise with the 3rd 
Fleet speak to the need. Mr. Jay Stefany, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, 
Development, and Acquisition), remarked about incorporating the end-users of the new 
technology tested during the 2021 Acquisition Research Symposium. He said, “We learned 
not only that the technology did what it was supposed to do, but we learned how to use it 
differently.” He also stated, “The real value was learning better ways to utilize manned and 
unmanned vessels both undersea and on the surface” (Stefany, 2021). This example 
highlights a practical result when warfighters are allowed to offer input. However, end-
users trained to present their ideas for materiel solutions based on their experience in KPPs, 
Critical Operational Issues, Measures of Effectiveness/Suitability, among other data 
elements, support the CBA process with increased effectiveness, especially if it aligns with 
the national strategic objectives.  
The second recommendation for BLWT is to allow warfighters to train newly 
acquired systems that would impact operational readiness. As reflected in the findings, the 
critical nature of the modern acquisition contract prevents most of the maintenance from 
being carried out by the warfighter. With much effort given to training warfighters on how 
to use the new system, very little is focused on their ability to conduct minor updates, such 
as software releases or repair components to the system itself. Contracting systems with 
our defense industrial base benefits end-users with the opportunity to learn ways to ensure 
it remains operational.  
This training could either be written as part of the materiel solution contract or 
contracted to the government entities that oversee personnel on the system’s platforms. 
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This increases knowledge of the warfighter on the system itself and provides the industrial 
base an opportunity to work alongside warfighters and gain insight into their thought 
processes associated with what would make the system the most effective. This 
recommendation also allows the defense acquisition programs to promote interoperability 
with our defense industrial base and increases the viability of suppliers by opening their 
perspectives to potential future capabilities. 
Although military personnel do make up internal elements of the Program of 
Record team, the emphasis presented here narrows on the end-users to fully capture the 
integrated role of the warfighter and the ability to develop requirements and capabilities. 
Like the Agile framework with continuous iterative developments, our research 
emphasized the opportunities that end-users have throughout the program life cycle, even 
to the LRIP or Milestone C stages. Military personnel assigned to the program removed 
from the front of the line experience, perhaps even for multiple years, limit the ability to 
present the latest operation tactics utilized. Current warfighters perhaps offer better insight 
to develop the performance measurements further to accomplish program objectives. 
While training warfighters to individual programs could benefit the relationship 
with industry meeting capability parameters that only meets an immediate goal. There are 
benefits to introducing end-user agreements and training to such in adaptive acquisition 
software upgrades. All stakeholders involved maintain clear lines of distinction regarding 
liabilities, risk, and restrictions for the materiel solution. However, the ultimate goal for 
developing the warfighter improves the overall efficiency in program life cycle processes. 
Acquisition Readiness by way of BLWT is a sustainable path forward to meeting 
all national strategy objectives and defense acquisition lines of effort. ‘Tailoring’ is a 
crucial concept for acquisition support. For example, the AAF allows the Major Capability 
Acquisition pathway to tailor “processes, reviews, and documentation…based on program 
size, complexity, risk, urgency, and other factors” (DOD, 2020, p. 12). Training the 
warfighters on acquisition principles would also benefit from tailoring to qualify based on 
the capability requirements. The distinction resides in some acquisitions being software-
intensive while others are hardware. The ability to tailor training allows opportunities to 
cultivate a deeper relationship between defense services and the industrial base while 
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allowing the business logic of the warfighter to reduce delays and mitigate gaps in 
identifying requirements and support life cycle maintenance of materiel solutions during 
operations.  
The DOD can review and leverage how the U.S. Army is instituting a concept 
called “Soldier-Centered Agile” that aligns with this paper’s first objective to include the 
user in the acquisition process and the team from the cradle to the grave. For over a decade, 
the U.S. Army focused its attention on reforming its acquisitions by adopting the Agile 
methodology: “The promise of Agile acquisition to enable responsive delivery of 
capabilities based on continuous user feedback (Soldier touchpoint events) has become a 
reality” (Savage-Knepshield, 2021, p. 23). A secondary benefit of revolutionizing its 
acquisition process was “to shed its reputation for being slow, frustrating, complicated, and 
expensive” (p. 23). The goal of “Soldier-Centered Agile” is to have the users in the design 
process and use the system to provide feedback. The feedback is critical when considering 
design trade-offs and making decisions. Many positives, such as innovation, can arise from 
this teaming; however, the users’ attention is the design team’s attention. This teaming 
brings about an investigation into prevalent or consistent issues.  
In contrast to the developer-led Agile philosophy, “Soldier-center design (SCD) is 
driven by human factors practitioners, human-systems integration analysts, or user 
experience professionals” (Savage-Knepshield, 2021, p. 24). The planning is early and 
informed by the touchpoint events to produce “a rough design that will evolve and 
crystallize through iterative user testing into a concrete final product” (p. 24). 
The Army integrated continuous iterative development, such as the sprints, 
releases, user stories, backlogs, and burn-down with the Soldier-centered design. The Army 
still followed the Defense Acquisition Framework. It merged the Agile methodology with 
its Soldier-Centered Design early in the plan to identify design areas that were critical and 
frequent tasks or problematic tasks. This process illustrates divergence from the F-35 JSF 
and other acquisitions that did not incorporate alternate or multiple acquisition pathways. 
User stories documented the design team demonstrating the capability in the field or during 
operations. Usability testing is conducted on software releases to catch issues early and 
41 
plan for their fixes as part of the process and planning. The Army identified the top lessons 
learned as listed below (Savage-Knepshield, 2021). 
1. “Build a strong design foundation with early Soldier-centered design 
activities” with iterative testing with users per Figure 15 (Savage-
Knepshield, 2021, para 9). 
 
Figure 15. Agile-SCD Process Integration. Source: Savage-Knepshield (2021) 
2. “Create multidisciplinary, user-focused, collaborative teams” (Savage-
Knepshield, 2021, para 10). The team should contain “developers, 
designers, engineers, domain subject matter experts, logistics, training, 
safety, cyber, and testers” (Savage-Knepshield, 2021, para 10). 
3. “Ensure development of a user interface style guide for all agile teams” 




Figure 16. Crucial Components for an Interface Style Guide. Source: Savage-
Knepshield (2021). 
4. “Refine the design with user feedback early and often” where  “Soldier-
centered design teams work one step ahead of the sprint to collect user 
feedback” (Savage-Knepshield, 2021, para 13). 
5. “Create user advisory panels” for feedback during events (Savage-
Knepshield, 2021, para 15). 
6. “Identify design goals and usability metrics” to ensure the team 
understands the performance and preference measures and metrics 
(Savage-Knepshield, 2021, para 16). 
7. “Standardize Soldier touchpoint event procedures” for consistency in 
templates and data collection (Savage-Knepshield, 2021, para 17). 
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8. “Fuel innovation with user feedback” by listening to their inputs during 
operational testing (Savage-Knepshield, 2021, para 19). 
9. “Include the team and stakeholders in Soldier touch-point events….as 
observers, facilitators, and data collectors” to gain concurrence for 
changes. (Savage-Knepshield, 2021, para 21). 
10. “Ensure funding and resources are set aside for Soldier touch-point 
events” (Savage-Knepshield, 2021, para 22). 
11. “Ensure Soldier-centered design changes are included in the configuration 
management process” (Savage-Knepshield, 2021, para 23). Figure 17 is an 
example of how and what is reviewed and documented. 
 
Figure 17. Refine the Design: A screen shot from an online survey designed 
to collect preference and performance data. Source: Savage-Knepshield 
(2021). 
C. JSF PROGRAM AND ALIS 
The JSF acquisition remains DOD’s highest procurement cost to date and has 
expanded to include other Allies cost-sharing to obtain this aircraft (Gertler, 2020). Since 
2001, the program’s schedule and costs have undergone three revisions (Ludwigson, 2021). 
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In one example, in early 2010, an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) formally 
restructured the JSF program. The restructure extended the System Development and 
Demonstration (SDD) phase by 13 months, further delaying achievement of Milestone C 
and Full-Rate Production to late calendar year 2015, revised program funding to align with 
the 13-month delay, and transitioned procurement funds to R&D to continue with 
development over procurement (Gertler, 2020). Additionally, under the reorganization, 
$614 million in award fees was withheld from “the contractor for poor performance, while 
adding incentives to produce more aircraft than planned within the new budget” (Gertler, 
2020, p. 13). The realignment delayed the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) and reduced 
aircraft by 122 (Gertler, 2020). Even with the program restructuring, the program’s 
“average procurement unit cost, in FY2002 dollars, had grown 57% to 89% over the 
original program baseline” (Gertler, 2020, p. 13). Despite cost being a primary program 
goal, the program was unable to contain costs. 
The acquisition costs exceeded the cost goals by $13.5B, along with schedule 
delays by six and half years, as shown in Figure 18 (Gertler, 2020). In 2016, the DOD 
assessed that a more significant government leadership role was necessary to help the 
struggling program and that while there are better improvements, they have not reached 
perfection yet (Gertler, 2020.) The bumper sticker in Figure 18 acknowledges that 
overcoming past challenges has been difficult. Designing and developing three variants 
while maintaining a high degree of commonality and undertaking the most complex and 
software-intensive system creates these challenges.  
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Figure 18. F-35 Program History as Brief to President-elect Trump, 2016 
Source: Congressional Research Service (2020). 
In early 2020 per FY2017 NDAA, the DOD reviewed alternate program 
management structures and proposed future changes to the F-35 Joint Program Office 
(Gertler, 2020). The overhead associated with the joint program did not seem like the 
appropriate format once the program was in the production phase (Gertler, 2020). Another 
reason for devolving the program office was acknowledging that the program had not 
reached its common goal and three distinct and separate aircraft (Gertler, 2020). The 
program achieved about 20–25% in commonality (Gertler, 2020). When the IOCs for the 
services were adjusted to accommodate schedule slips, each service would receive different 
software packages (Gertler, 2020). At the time of the Congressional Research Service 2020 
report, there was no schedule for the restructuring of the program office. 
The concurrency acquisition strategy by the JSF program did not result in as much 
success as expected initially. Schedules and milestones reflected design tools, modeling, 
and simulation data that were neither perfect nor precise enough to positively influence 
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concurrent development, testing, and production (Ferran, 2012). The issue with the 
accompanying plan is that the “first demonstrations will occur after the critical design 
review after most of the design drawings have been released and after manufacturing has 
begun for many of the remaining test aircraft” (GlobalSecurity.org, n.d., para 6). The issue 
with the program schedule is the discovery of significant design problems during prototype 
demonstration and the “time and money for redesign efforts and retrofitting of test aircraft 
already in the manufacturing process” (GlobalSecurity.org, n.d., para 6). The program 
entered Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) phase in December 2018 with 13 
Category 1 or “must-fix” deficiencies that impacted safety or combat capability (Gertler, 
2020). Test pilots involved with the acquisition team in 2004 “were involved with the 
continuing development of the F-35’s control system, improving the aircraft/pilot interface 
and control functions” (GlobalSecurity.org, n.d., para 11). The test pilots performed in-
flight simulations.  
The program adopted the Continuous Capability Development and Delivery 
(C2D2) for software systems based on the Agile software development processes 
(Ludwigson, 2021). This change aimed to improve the cycle of software development, 
validation, and testing and add capabilities with succeeding blocks (Gertler, 2020). 
However, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation noted that the current C2D2 
process was already lagging behind schedule, ineffective in adding new capabilities in 
increments or fixing deficiencies, and “often introduced stability problems and adversely 
affected other functionality” (Gertler, 2020, p. 22). Figure 19 shows the iterative 
development and testing plan. Similar to the Agile process with incremental builds and 
releases, the C2D2 contains four increments: 
• “Increment 1 should contain all new capabilities for the software drop so 
initial testing may proceed as planned” (Williams Brown, 2021, p. 32). 
• “Increment 2 should address any identified deficiencies found during 
testing of Increment 1 and mature capabilities as needed” (Williams 
Brown, 2021, p. 32). 
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• Increment 3 handles deficiencies discovered during prior testing and 
ensures improvements to capabilities (Williams Brown, 2021). 
• Increment 4 version is intended to be production-ready version with no 
significant fixes needed. This final version is for delivery to the user 
(Williams Brown, 2021, p. 32). 
Figure 19 depicts uniformed users; however, we could not find data because some 
issues, such as missing capabilities and software defects, were not uncovered during 
various developmental testing. This diagram does not show how the defects were discussed 
and prioritized with the team, including the warfighter. In reality, the iterations with the 
increments did not go as planned per Figure 20. 
 
Figure 19. F-35 Notional Block 4 Iterative Development Test and Delivery 
Schedule. Source: Government Accountability Office (2021). 
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Figure 20. F-35 Actual Software Increments Exceed Number of Planned 
Increments. Source: Government Accountability Office (2021). 
As of March 2021, the program is still in the low-rate initial production while at the 
same time modernizing and performing operational testing (Ludwigson, 2021). The 
decision to delay Milestone C and Full-Rate Production is due to delays in the F-35 Joint 
Simulation Environment or the aircraft simulator development (see Figure 21) 
(Ludwigson, 2021). The aircraft simulator is essential to replicate test scenarios that are 
not practicable to execute in the operational or real-work environment (Ludwigson, 2021). 
There is currently no schedule from the DOD or the JSF program for Full-Rate Production. 
 
Figure 21. F-35 Operational Test Schedule and key Events Through 2021, as 
of November 2020. Source: Government Accountability Office (2021). 
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Regarding ALIS and user testing, program data was not easy to find on the internet. 
However, the GAO formed focus groups with ALIS users from pilots, maintainers, 
administrators, and trainers. The focus groups were “held at five F-35 operational or testing 
sites’’ to identify “some benefits of the system” (Russell, 2016, p. 14). The main benefit 
was a single, electronic system that contained information traditionally located in several 
databases or on paper. The singular access to all technical data created more accessibility 
to maintain updates to the data and manuals. The focus group accepted the immaturity of 
the system given where it was in the program schedule. The group noted several 
functionality issues as outlined in Figure 22 (Russell, 2016). GAO recommended plans to 
fix the problems related to deployability, lack of redundancy in the infrastructure, little 
interoperability with legacy systems, lack of transparency of Action Request and the 
reliance on the contractor, inaccuracy and accessibility of the data, immaturity of the Off-
board Mission Support (OMS) and Training Management System (TMS), and 
cybersecurity concerns. 
 
Figure 22. ALIS Risks Identified by Users in GAO’s Focus Groups. Source: 
Government Accountability Office (2016). 
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The ALIS system did not work as designed when deployed. The system’s 
cybersecurity capability was not quickly upgradable and was vulnerable to hacks (Gertler, 
2020). The system performed poorly—false alarms resulted in wasted time and resources 
with unnecessary maintenance, the data entry interface was labor-intensive, system boot-
up and updates were lengthy, and the tablets that the maintainers relied on did not stay 
technologically up to date with market capabilities (Tirpak, 2020). Software version 
updates improved the system, but continued inadequacies due to deficiencies negatively 
impacted troubleshooting and fixing non-operational aircraft back into service (Gertler, 
2020). The GAO had published reports detailing ALIS issues and discovered that for 
maintainers in one U.S. Air Force unit, “more than 45,000 hours per year performing 
additional tasks and manual workarounds because ALIS was not functioning” as promised 
(Tirpak, 2020, para 9). The challenge to the system appears to be the architecture designed 
in the 1990s (Gertler, 2020). The acquisition process took too long where the system was 
obsolete and not easy to upgrade once ready for operational use. No matter how cutting-
edge the technology, there are limitations on existing technologies that affect the ability to 
upgrade well into the service life of assets. 
According to GAO analysis, “ALIS may not be deployable” (Gertler, 2020, p. 23). 
The Marine Corps often works in remote areas ill-equipped to provide simple internet 
services for ALIS to connect to the globally networked infrastructure. ALIS does not 
contain redundancy, and any loss of system components can “take the entire F-35 fleet 
offline” (Gertler, 2020, p. 23). Operators have had to use manual workarounds for 
automated taskings. And while the F-35 aircraft can operate and fly without ALIS, the 
promised capability of proactive maintenance and sustainment planning is missing. Had 
the JSF program team indeed received user feedback early and often throughout the 
acquisition process, the situation with ALIS could have been caught earlier and managed. 
One questions how the system fared during the Test and Evaluation Phase where there were 
users involved and how ALIS passed testing. 
With technology in the United States, the design teams often forget that parts of the 
world are rural enough not to have some of the amenities available. Understanding the 
operating conditions of current and potential mission areas is critical. This knowledge 
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provides engaged warfighter data to ensure requirements are achievable in the 
environments where the assets are be deployed and used. 
Sustainability costs of F-35 aircraft remain a concern (Gertler, 2020). Adding to the 
short-term funding challenges, the DOD and the JSF program already had plans to replace 
the ALIS with a new system that is called the Operational Data Integrated Network 
(ODIN). With the later introduction of ODIN, the system can leverage modern software 
languages and architectures, hardware technologies, and best commercial practices 
(Gertler, 2020). In contrast to a typical acquisition where the complete system is developed 
and delivered by the vendor, with ODIN, Lockheed Martin is required to provide the 
hardware; however, the government has taken the lead and control on the software package 
(Insinna, 2021). ODIN expects to be “more user-friendly and less prone to error” (Gertler, 
2020, p. 24). With a new integrated data environment, the purpose of the new development 
effort through ODIN is to provide the F-35 fleet with a working sustainment tool that 
includes readiness performance (Tirpak, 2020). Another goal to learn from ALIS is the 
reduction in workload for operators and administrators and “allow software designers to 
rapidly develop and deploy updates in response to operator needs” (Tirpa, 2020, para 2).  
The fully operational program, planned for December 2022, was impacted by a 
funding cut in FY21. ODIN development and testing funding was trimmed by 42%. Part 
of the funding challenges appears to be affected by the program’s “underestimating the 
complexity of deprecating ALIS capabilities while migrating to ODIN” (Insinna, 2021, 
para 5). With this reduction, the program office has opted to pause the ODIN project. Until 
ODIN is completed and deployed, the Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Allies continue to 
use ALIS and manual workarounds. The program is continuing to improve ALIS until the 
funding situation for ODIN improves. 
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Developing the business logic of the warfighter adds an understanding of the 
financial risks involved within the acquisition framework. The industrial base managers 
thoroughly understand the financial risks involved in contracts as it directly affects their 
profits, revenue, and job security. The untrained DOD service member assigned to a project 
increases the associated financial risk by not fully understanding the important connection 
between budgets and future years defense planning. Increasing business logic aims to 
decrease the liabilities of the decision-makers. While the industrial base manager is eager 
to thrive on a capitalistic opportunity in a potentially significant contract with the DOD, 
the warfighter’s expectations of a new weapon system may overshadow the understanding 
of economic indicators. Gross domestic product, price indexes, and production rates are 
examples of those indicators. Business managers rely on economic indicators. 
Alternatively, the DOD focuses on acquiring a specific capability, unaware of how these 
indicators work and their impact on the contract.  
The objective of developing the business logic of the warfighter is to ensure all 
activities, processes, products, and concerns lead to a more efficient defense acquisition 
program. Business logic leads to not only documenting these needs but developing them 
faster and more accurately. Building a sustainable model creates the business logic of the 
warfighter that requires DOD leadership to see beyond the basic managerial concepts of 
planning, organizing, and directing service members towards war prevention objectives. It 
is one that also includes a partnership with the industrial base around their economics and 
technological developments.  
Meeting this objective provides the much-needed balance to the industrial base’s 
competitive advantage over the military in recent decades. The industrial base advances 
capabilities much faster than the DOD. Demands for product changes often show a specific 
pattern that industrial base business managers are familiar with overall. Marketing teams 
are dispersed into the consumer market to gather data that reflects how products are 
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performing and meeting the needs of their customers. There is not much cognitive 
dissonance of how well the latest development is performing. Immediate feedback is 
communicated back rather quickly due to dedicated customer service representatives and 
social media. Also included on the front end for the industrial base managers are decision 
support systems. 
B. RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER STUDY IN ACQUISITION 
ALIGNMENT 
The DOD is addressing the historical concerns and working to influence current 
major acquisition programs. Recently, the DOD pushed significant reform in two essential 
areas. One is the revisions to the DODI 5000.02 to DODI 5000.02T Operation of the 
Adaptive Acquisition Framework to expedite acquisition through additional options and 
emphasize the move away from the waterfall process. The second is organizational, with 
dividing the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
into two divisions: USD for Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S) and USD for Research 
and Engineering (R&E). These changes will largely influence how the DOD and industry 
collaborate for improved and agile acquisitions. These advancements push for new 
opportunities to broaden the business logic of the warfighters and incorporate them further 
in the acquisition and sustainment programs.  
Whether intentional or not, the DODD 5000.01 rewrite implements 
recommendations from the Section Panel to maintain a professional workforce. Enabling 
the workforce of acquisition professionals and warfighters is vital to national defense. 
Current DAU training states, “Consequently, the DOD must recruit, develop, and maintain 
a fully proficient military and civilian acquisition workforce that is highly skilled across a 
broad range of management, technical, and business disciplines” (Kobren, 2020, para 9). 
Revising warfighter training aligns with methods to understand acquisition concepts and 
processes and meets the objectives associated with DAMS and the acquisition life cycle.  
The technological advancements of knowledge management systems could also be 
valuable to future acquisition teams. These systems provide information virtually for all 
employees to contribute to or learn from that promotes enterprise-wide communication, 
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and the increased rate at which information becomes available is increasing. Personnel with 
specific skill sets and expertise may use these systems to provide feedback to top-level 
management. Doing so removes the obstacle of getting the latest information without delay 
to aid future decisions. Establishing this type of risk management from which to operate is 
critical. Senior leaders may then proactively champion employees and stakeholders down 
to the lowest level to provide feedback. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Four additional areas could benefit from further research. The first area is research 
into DOD’s Acquisition Environment, including “Big A” and “Little A” acquisition. While 
this research topic touched on the “Big A” acquisition as a limitation to continued success 
for reform with “Little A” acquisition at a very high level, we did not dive into researching 
the “Big A” acquisition. Analysis and recommended reform to better align with the rapid 
acquisition strategies of “Little A” acquisition warrant further research. Programs with 
realignment to rapid acquisition strategies gain limited success with flexibility and agility 
if there is no flexibility with the budgeting through the PPBE and capability updates 
through the JCIDS.  
The second topic is whether the current military design fights today and tomorrow’s 
wars or is too entrenched in the structure that led to successes during the two world wars. 
The United States military has struggled since the Vietnam War, where guerilla warfare 
was prevalent. Today’s wars have not been traditional, and tomorrow’s wars do not look 
to return to conventional warfare.  
The third suggested topic is researching the effects of program managers’ levels of 
authority to go with their responsibilities. The dynamics of how program managers would 
strategically plan and tactically execute could result in better results with on-time deliveries 
of warfighter assets within cost and schedule. Though government regulations drive many 
decisions made by program managers throughout the acquisition life cycle, internal 
barriers, such as rank or positional authority, may contribute to negative externalities 
associated with high-risk choices.  
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The final area recommended here is the role of warfighters in the acquisitions of 
autonomous materiel solutions. As more integration occurs between artificial intelligence-
enabled systems, warfighters’ contributions in designing these emerging capabilities will 
align closer to mission objectives and maintain advantages in competition and conflict. 
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